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 “Even though the legislature has done quite a bit . . . there are still prob–
lems about how Ohio funds its schools. We’ll probably say the same thing 
in 10 years. This is not an issue that you can solve once and for all.”1 
- Paul Marshall 
Introduction 
Twenty-five years ago, Mark Hawk commented in the Case 
Western Reserve Law Review2 on an interesting Ohio case recently 
concluded in the Perry County Court of Common Pleas: DeRolph v. 
 
1. Jim Siegel, Failure’s Lessons, Columbus Dispatch (Dec. 14, 2008, 12:01 
AM), https://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/insight/2008/12/14/ 
 Marshall_Funding.ART_ART_12-14-08_G1_8UC6SPU.html [https:// 
 perma.cc/ZW2D-CM9U]. 
2. Morris L. Hawk, Comment, “As Perfect as Can Be Devised”: DeRolph v. 
State of Ohio and the Right to Education in Ohio, 45 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 679, 679 (1995). 
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State.3 There, the trial court struck down Ohio’s education-financing 
system as unconstitutional because it did not provide a “thorough and 
efficient system of common schools” as required by Article VI, Section 
II of the Ohio Constitution.4 Hawk opined that Ohio appellate courts 
should uphold that ruling and officially recognize a fundamental right 
to education in Ohio.5 He noted that the trial court’s decision was “the 
first act in a three-act drama that will not conclude until the Ohio 
Supreme Court rules.”6 Looking back, we now know that DeRolph’s 
drama unfolded in five cases over thirteen years, concluding with a 
murky holding that left litigants—and virtually everyone else—unsure 
of the future for Ohio’s education funding. 
Twelve years after Hawk’s comment, Shadya Yazback, another 
Case Western Reserve Law Review contributor, provided an overview 
of the DeRolph litigation saga.7 Yazback attempted to clearly define 
what the multiple decisions meant for Ohio’s ability to provide a 
“thorough and efficient” system of education; she also analyzed whether 
current legislative proposals had lived up to this standard.8 Yazback 
described an education-financing system that was strikingly similar to 
both the one held unconstitutional in the first DeRolph trial and to the 
one that exists today.9 
This Comment continues Hawk’s and Yazback’s project, and 
attempts to describe DeRolph’s impacts on Ohio’s education financing 
more than twenty-five years after the Perry Common Pleas Court 
provided its initial holding in the matter. This Comment focuses 
primarily on the long-term legislative and funding outcomes of the 
DeRolph litigation. Part I addresses the legal framework around the 
right to education in Ohio, and provides an overview of the history of 
education-financing litigation in Ohio. Part II reviews legislative 
attempts to address education funding since DeRolph, noting the 
similarities of each system. And Part III outlines both the temporary 
 
3. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum, No. 22043 
(Ohio C.P. Ct. July 1, 1994), https://www.bricker.com/documents/resources/ 
 schoolfund/070194cp.pdf. 
4. DeRolph, No. 22043 at 914. 
5. Hawk, supra note 2, at 702–03. 
6. Id. at 681 (quoting Tim Miller, Court Voids System; Ohio School Funding 
Unconstitutional, Dayton Daily News, July 2, 1994, at 1A). 
7. See generally Shadya Yazback, Note, School Financing in Ohio Yesterday, 
Today, Tomorrow: Searching for a “Thorough and Efficient” System of 
Public Schools, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 671 (2007). 
8. See generally id. 
9. Id. at 714; Legislative Budget Office, Ohio Legislative Serv. 
Comm’n., School Funding Complete Resource 3 (2019), available at 
https://www.lsc.ohio.gov/documents/reference/current/schoolfunding/ 
 sfcr_feb2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/B28E-7EJU]. 
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and lasting impacts DeRolph has had on Ohio’s education-financing 
system. 
I. History of Ohio Education Finance Litigation 
To fully understand the DeRolph cases, they must be put into 
context of the constitutional framework that protects education in 
Ohio, the history of Ohio school financing, and the Ohio Supreme 
Court’s earlier school-funding decision in Board of Education v. 
Walter.10 
A. The Right to Education in Ohio 
Unlike the United States Constitution, most state constitutions 
include provisions guaranteeing the right to at least some level of 
education.11 Ohio is no exception: Article VI, Section II of the Ohio 
Constitution provides that “[t]he General Assembly shall make such 
provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from 
the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of 
common schools throughout the state.”12 Ohio’s Constitution also 
grants equal protection of the laws to its people.13 These provisions 
 
10. 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979). 
11. See Emily Parker, Educ. Comm’n of the States, 50-State Review: 
Constitutional Obligations for Public Education 1 (2016); School 
Funding Court Decisions, SchoolFunding.info, http://schoolfunding.info/ 
 school-funding-court-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/RJZ4-H52L] (last visited 
June 28, 2020). Beginning in the 1960s, individuals opposed to the use of 
property taxes as a primary means of funding education challenged school 
funding systems as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. The Supreme 
Court addressed these challenges in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). There, the Court held that education is not 
a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 37. The Court 
applied a rational-basis test, finding that the Texas school-funding system 
bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest: local control of 
education. Id. at 39–47. This loss in the Supreme Court pushed opponents 
of school-funding systems to continue their fight in state courts. See, e.g., 
School Funding Court Decisions, supra. In the 1960s, most challenges to 
school-funding systems were under the Equal Protection Clause of states’ 
constitutions. Roughly 66% of Equal Protection challenges were 
successful. See id. In the 1990s, opponents of property tax-based education 
funding began to challenge the school-funding systems under the 
Education Clauses of state constitutions, with plaintiffs prevailing in 
about 60% percent of those cases since 1989. See id. 
12. Ohio Const. art. VI § 2 (emphasis added). 
13. Id. art. I § 2 (“All political power is inherent in the people. Government 
is instituted for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right 
to alter, reform, or abolish the same, whenever they may deem it necessary 
. . . .”). 
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served as the basis for challenges to the education financing system in 
DeRolph, as litigants alleged that, by underfunding schools, the state 
breached its duty to provide a thorough and efficient system of common 
schools.14 
B. History of Ohio Education Financing Before Board of Education v. 
Walter 
Historically, the primary means of financing local public schools 
came through local property taxes.15 “In 1825, the General Assembly 
enacted legislation allowing county commissioners to levy a” tax on real 
property through units known as “mills.”16 A “mill” equates to one-
thousandth of one dollar ($0.001) and is used to determine the amount 
of money raised through property taxes.17 In 1935, the Ohio General 
Assembly enacted the first School Foundation Program to provide state 
aid to local school districts to supplement the amount raised by 
property taxes.18 The amount of aid provided by the state increased 
over time.19 In the 2018 fiscal year, 45.8% of all education funding 
statewide came from local sources, and 48.8% came from state sources.20 
The question of determining the correct composition of state versus 
local aid necessary to provide a “thorough and efficient system of public 
schools” was key in Ohio school-financing litigation. 
C. Board of Education v. Walter (1979) 
In 1979, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a school-
financing system in Board of Education v. Walter.21 Thus, under–
standing the differences between the education-financing system in 
Walter and the system addressed in DeRolph offers some insight into 
what constitutes a “thorough and efficient system of common schools.” 
Only a few years before Walter, the state legislature reconfigured 
Ohio’s school-funding system into two key parts: an Education Review 
 
14. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 740 (Ohio 1997). 
15. Id. at 750 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
16. Id.  
17. Larry J. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and Ohio’s Long Road to an Adequate 
Education, 2005 BYU Educ. & L.J. 83, 92 n.63 (2005). 
18. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 750 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
19. Id.  
20. Legislative Budget Office, supra note 9. 
21. 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Suzanne Ernst Drummond, Comment, Deja 
Vu: The Status of School Funding in Ohio After DeRolph II, 68 U. Cin. 
L. Rev. 435, 440 (2000). 
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Committee and an Equal Yield Formula.22 The Education Review 
Committee recommended a “minimum amount of funding necessary” 
for each student to receive a “general education of high quality.”23 The 
Equal Yield Formula guaranteed that a specific amount of funding per 
student per mill of the first twenty mills assessed by the local school 
district went to schools.24 The state would make up any deficiency 
between the amount generated by local taxes and the amount 
designated by the Educational Review Committee.25 Thus, under the 
Equal Yield Formula, no school district would receive less than the 
amount that the Educational Review Committee determined was 
necessary for each student to receive a “general education of high 
quality.”26 If school districts wanted to raise additional funds above the 
state-determined “minimum amount necessary,” then local school 
districts could levy additional millage on top of the first twenty mills 
taxed at the local level.27 
In Walter, the Cincinnati School District, along with parents and 
students, challenged Ohio’s school-funding system, claiming that it 
violated both the Equal Protection and Education Clauses of Ohio’s 
Constitution.28 Applying a rational-basis test, the Ohio Supreme Court 
held that the funding system complied with both constitutional clauses29 
because the system served the state’s legitimate interest in local control 
of schools.30 In addition, the court based its decision on the existence of 
the Education Review Committee and its determination of the amount 
of funding necessary for each student to receive a “general education of 
high quality.”31 Because every district received at least the minimum 
 
22. See Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 816–17; DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 750 (Douglas, 
J., concurring). 
23. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 817; Drummond, supra note 21, at 440. 
24. Drummond, supra note 21, at 441. 
25. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 816; Drummond, supra note 21, at 441. 
26. Drummond, supra note 21, at 440–41. 
27. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 816; Drummond, supra note 21, at 441. 
28. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 815, 817. 
29. The court was unclear about whether education constituted a 
fundamental right under the Ohio Constitution. Regardless, the court 
applied rational-basis review to the school-funding system and held that 
the current system allowed for more local control over education; and local 
control provided a rational basis for any of the spending disparities that 
arose out of that system. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 822; Obhof, supra note 
17, at 93. 
30. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 822. 
31. Id. at 817; Obhof, supra note 17, at 93; Drummond, supra note 21, at 441. 
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amount determined by the Educational Review Committee, the state 
fulfilled its Constitutional duty.32 
D. The School Foundation Program 
Just three years after the Walter decision, the General Assembly 
abolished both the Education Review Committee and the Equal Yield 
Formula.33 The Ohio legislature implemented a new school-funding 
program called the School Foundation Program.34 The base amount 
provided by the School Foundation Program comprised three key 
components: the foundation amount, the cost-of-doing-business factor, 
and the average daily attendance.35 The foundation amount was the 
base per-student dollar amount set by the General Assembly.36 The 
cost-of-doing-business factor varied from district to district based on 
assumptions about the cost of running schools in various localities.37 
Finally, the state would also subtract an amount known as a “charge 
off” equal to 2% of the district’s taxable real and tangible property.38 
E. DeRolph I (1991–1997) 
In an effort to combat low funding levels and inadequate facilities, 
a group of superintendents in southeast Ohio established a coalition39 
 
32. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 825; Drummond, supra note 21, at 441. 
33. Obhof, supra note 17, at 94. 
34. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 750–51 (Ohio 1997) 
(Douglas, J., concurring); Drummond, supra note 21, at 443. 
35. DeRolph I at 750–51. The School Foundation Program’s mathematical 
formula is as follows:  
[school district equalization factor × (Cost of Doing Business 
Factor) × average daily membership (ADM))] - (.02 × total 
taxable property value).  
 Id. at 738 n.3 (majority opinion). 
36. Drummond, supra note 21, at 443–44. 
37. Id. The cost-of-doing-business factor disadvantaged rural districts, as it 
assumed that the cost of doing business would always be lower in rural 
districts than in urban districts. See id. 
38. See Obhof, supra note 17, at 103; Drummond, supra note 21, at 444 n.76. 
The “charge off” was a proxy for the amount of money a school district 
could raise through local taxation with 2% equating to 20 mills. See 
DeRolph I at 751-52, 739; Obhof, supra note 17, at 103. 
39. Obhof, supra note 17, at 95–96. Originally the group was called Promoting 
Appalachian and Rural Initiatives for Teaching Youth (PARITY). After 
several reorganizations, the group broadened their membership and 
renamed themselves as the Ohio Coalition for Equity & Adequacy of 
School Funding. Id. 
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to lobby members of the Ohio General Assembly.40 Seeing little success 
in their lobbying efforts, the coalition refocused and decided to litigate 
the constitutionality of Ohio’s educational-funding system.41 In 1991, 
the coalition, through several of its member school districts, students, 
and other interested individuals, brought suit in the Perry County 
Court of Common Pleas, alleging that Ohio’s current system of school 
funding violated the Equal Protection and Education Clauses of the 
Ohio Constitution.42 This litigation, kicking off what is known as the 
DeRolph cases, turned into a thirteen-year-long legal battle to 
determine the adequacy of Ohio’s school-funding system.43 
In the first DeRolph challenge (DeRolph I), after a long and 
complex trial, the trial court issued a 478-page opinion containing 
extensive findings of fact and law.44 The factual findings regarding the 
state of Ohio’s schools painted an abysmal portrait of the educational 
environment. For instance, in the Southern Local School District, 
students would not use the bathroom because they were infested with 
cockroaches, and the schools had no heat “from the beginning of the 
fall of 1992 until the end of November or beginning of December.”45 
Teachers and administrators had to reuse old textbooks and ration 
school supplies, including toilet paper.46 In the Dawson-Bryant school 
system, students breathed coal dust emitted from their coal heating 
system.47 The school also offered no foreign language courses, computer 
courses, or art and music courses (other than band).48 In addition, many 
of Ohio’s school facilities were not in compliance with state building 
codes.49 According to the 1990 Ohio Public School Facility Survey, one-
half of Ohio’s school buildings were at least fifty years old.50 Only 17% 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 96. 
42. Id. at 98, 100. 
43. See generally id. The Coalition filed the first challenge in 1991; the 
litigation’s final ruling was handed down on May 16, 2003. See State ex 
rel. State v. Lewis (DeRolph V), 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003); see also 
Obhof, supra note 17, at 146. 
44. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum, 
DeRolph v. State, No. 22043 (Ohio C.P. Ct. July 1, 1994), https://www 
 .bricker.com/documents/resources/schoolfund/070194cp.pdf; Obhof, supra 
note 17, at 100. 
45. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 743–44 (Ohio 1997). 
46. Id. at 744. 
47. Id. at 743. 
48. Id. at 744. 
49. Id. at 742. 
50. Id. 
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of schools’ heating systems and 31% of schools’ roofs were satisfactory; 
and only 20% of the buildings had satisfactory access for people with 
disabilities.51 
The trial court found that Ohio’s education-funding system violated 
both the Equal Protection and the Education Clauses of the Ohio 
Constitution.52 But, relying on Walter, the Fifth District Court of 
Appeals reversed.53 Two years later, the Ohio Supreme Court—by a 4–
3 split—reversed the Fifth District’s decision.54 The majority held that 
the school-financing system was unconstitutional under the Education 
Clause because it did not provide a “thorough and efficient system of 
common schools.”55 Distinguishing the School Foundation Program 
from the system in Walter, the court found that the foundation amount 
was effectively a budgetary residual and did not relate to “what it 
actually costs to educate a pupil.”56 Similarly, the court determined that 
the state failed to tie the cost-of-doing-business factor to the actual cost 
of running and maintaining a school.57 
The court also took issue with the “charge-off” portion of the 
formula because, although property values may rise in a particular 
district, “tax reduction factors” limited the ability of localities to recoup 
taxes from those property-value increases.58 The tax reduction factors 
were largely tied to property tax limitations under House Bill 920, 
passed in 1976.59 Under H.B. 920, voted levies could not raise more 
revenue from existing properties than they generated in the initial year 
 
51. Id. 
52. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum, 
DeRolph v. State, No. 22043 (Ohio C.P. Ct. July 1, 1994), https://www 
 .bricker.com/documents/resources/schoolfund/070194cp.pdf; Drummond, 
supra note 21, at 442. 
53. DeRolph v. State, CA-477, 1995 WL 557316, at *2–3, *9 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 30, 1995); Obhof, supra note 17, at 100; Drummond, supra note 21, 
at 442. 
54. See DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 733; Obhof, supra note 17, at 101. 
55. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 737; Drummond, supra note 21, at 442. 
56. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 738, 745–46. 
57. Id. at 738; Drummond, supra note 21, at 444. 
58. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 739; Obhof, supra note 17, at 103. 
59. See 1975–1976 Ohio Laws 3182 (codified at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 319.301 
(West 2020)); Ohio Sch. Funding Advisory Council, Education 
Finance Overview 3 (2010), available at https://www.westerville.k12.oh.us/ 
 docs/Education%20Finance%20Overview%20-%20Meeting%20Briefing% 
 20010710.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5VN-56G9]. Due to rapid inflation in 
the 1970s, housing values and property taxes ballooned. H.B. 920 
attempted to protect tax payers (especially pensioners) from the effects of 
rampant inflation on their property taxes. Id. 
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the levy was passed.60 Thus, if property values rose in subsequent years, 
tax rates were adjusted downward to match the revenue level of the 
levy’s initial year.61 The Ohio Supreme Court called this problem 
“phantom revenue” because school districts with increases in property 
values could not receive additional property tax income but could lose 
education funding due to the increased “charge-off.”62 
The court identified four factors that “must be eliminated” to make 
the school funding system constitutional:  
(1) the operation of the School Foundation Program, (2) the 
emphasis of Ohio’s school funding system on local property tax, 
(3) the requirement of school district borrowing through the 
spending reserve and emergency school assistance loan programs, 
and (4) the lack of sufficient funding in the General Assembly’s 
biennium budget for the construction and maintenance of public 
buildings.63  
Although the court outlined the four unconstitutional components of 
the then-existing school-funding system, it gave no specific guidance for 
how the legislature could change the system to fulfill its constitutional 
duty.64 Instead, the court remanded the case, giving the legislature one 
year to address the system’s flaws.65 
In March 1997, Governor George Voinovich created and convened 
the Ohio School Funding Task Force to address the issues raised in 
DeRolph I.66 The Task Force hired education-funding consultant John 
Augenblick to develop a funding system to address the flaws set out in 
DeRolph I.67 Augenblick proposed the “Successful Schools” model, 
which analyzed academically successful districts’ spending to establish 
the base cost of an adequate education.68 
The legislature attempted to address Augenblick’s suggestions by 
increasing the amount of base funding per pupil in the next biennial 
budget. The legislature increased the amount of base funding per pupil 
 
60. Ohio Sch. Funding Advisory Council, supra note 59.  
61. Id. 
62. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 739; Obhof, supra note 17, at 103. 
63. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 747; see Drummond, supra note 21, at 442–48. 
64. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 747; Drummond, supra note 21, at 447 & n.95. 
65. Drummond, supra note 21, at 447. 
66. Ohio Sch. Funding Advisory Council, supra note 59, at 5. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 5–6. 
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from $3,663 in the 1998 fiscal year69 to $4,063 in 1999.70 Although the 
legislature increased the base amount, they largely left the School 
Foundation Program’s formula unchanged.71 The Ohio legislature also 
created four committees to address academic accountability, fiscal 
issues, the funding formula, and other issues.72 Throughout 1997, the 
legislature appropriated $300 million for capital improvements to 
schools.73 The state also replaced the previous borrowing regime with 
the Solvency Assistance Fund, which provided interest-free loans 
funded by the state.74 
F. DeRolph II (2000) 
Dissatisfied with the legislature’s actions to improve the school-
funding system, DeRolph I’s plaintiffs renewed their objections in a 
second round of litigation (DeRolph II).75 The Supreme Court of Ohio 
again held that, although the legislature had made some improvements 
over the last year, it had still failed to provide a “thorough and 
efficient” system of schools.76 The system was still unconstitutional 
because the state had failed to change the basic funding formula, still 
relied too much on local tax revenue, still required borrowing from 
future expenses, and still required schools to comply with unfunded 
legislative mandates.77 Again, the court did not provide the legislature 
with any specific recommendations,78 but this time it clearly defined 
“thorough” and “efficient” within the context of the Education Clause:  
 
69. 122nd Final Bill Analysis, Ohio Legis. Serv. Comm’n (Feb. 13, 1998), 
http://lsc.state.oh.us/coderev/fnla122.nsf/All%20Bills%20and%20Resolution
s/998577E661C3B00B8525668A004B5595 [https://perma.cc/5VQD-HAMP]. 
70. Id. The state, however, failed to appropriate the funds for the base-
amount increase, instead appropriating only $3,851 per student in fiscal 
year 1999. See Drummond, supra note 21, at 449. The legislature also 
attempted to increase education funding through Issue 2—a referendum 
for a one-cent sales tax increase to finance education. See Obhof, supra 
note 17, at 115–16. Unfortunately, voters were suspicious of Issue 2 and 
referendum failed by a margin of four to one. See id. at 117–18. 
71. Obhof, supra note 17, at 115. 
72. Id. at 114. 
73. Id. 
74. Drummond, supra note 21, at 450. In the previous borrowing regime, 
school districts were forced to borrow from commercial lenders and pay 
commercial interest rates. Obhof, supra note 17, at 103. 
75. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II), 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000). 
76. Id. at 1020–21. 
77. See id. at 1021. 
78. See id. at 1001; Obhof, supra note 17, at 123. 
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A thorough system means that each and every school district has 
enough funds to operate. An efficient system is one in which each 
and every school district in the state has an ample number of 
teachers, sound buildings that are in compliance with state fire 
and building codes, and equipment sufficient for all students to 
be afforded an educational opportunity.79 
While the DeRolph II litigation was ongoing, the Ohio legislature 
continued to appropriate funds for schools. Between DeRolph I and 
DeRolph II, the General Assembly passed legislation to allocate nearly 
$2 billion toward school facilities.80 In addition, the state allocated $2.5 
billion over twelve years from the Tobacco Master Settlement 
Agreement for school construction.81 After DeRolph II, the legislature 
also accelerated funding to urban districts, provided permanent funds 
to districts below the fiftieth percentile of funding, and provided 
assistance to districts suffering from natural disasters.82 The legislature 
increased the base amount of per pupil spending to $4,814 in the 2002 
fiscal year and it changed the basic funding formula so that per-pupil 
spending would increase by 2.8% per year.83 
G. DeRolph III & IV (2001–2002) 
Despite those changes, the DeRolph plaintiffs argued that they did 
not fundamentally change Ohio’s school-funding system. Thus, they 
renewed their challenge against the State in 2001 (DeRolph III).84 In 
DeRolph III, a majority of the Ohio Supreme Court held once more 
that the funding system was unconstitutional; but the court’s 
willingness to continue this controversial litigation seemed to be 
waning.85 And so this time, the court specified three changes necessary 
to make Ohio’s school funding-system constitutional: (1) a new base-
cost formula, (2) gap aid for “phantom revenue,” and (3) parity aid for 
poor districts.86 
 
79. DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1001. 
80. Obhof, supra note 17, at 120. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 131. 
83. Id. 
84. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph III), 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001); Obhof, 
supra note 17, at 131–36. 
85. See DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1200–01; Obhof, supra note 17, at 135; 
see DeRolph v. State (DeRolph IV), 780 N.E.2d 529, 530 (Ohio 2002) 
(“The consensus arrived at in DeRolph III was in many ways the result 
of impatience.”). 
86. DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1192, 1200–01. The decision to provide specific 
guidance was seen by fellow Justices and commentators as the judiciary 
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After the legislature had spent the past five years working to 
improve the school-funding system, it responded to DeRolph III “with 
a big yawn.”87 The State immediately filed a motion requesting the Ohio 
Supreme Court to reconsider its decision.88 The court agreed to 
reconsider the case in November 200189 and over a year later, it 
reversed:  
We do not regret [DeRolph III] . . . . However, upon being asked 
to reconsider that decision, we have changed our collective mind. 
Despite the many good aspects of DeRolph III, we now vacate it. 
Accordingly, DeRolph I and II are the law of the case, and the 
current school-funding system is unconstitutional.90  
Confused by the short and contradictory opinion, the plaintiffs 
again tried to litigate the case in the trial court.91 But the Ohio Supreme 
Court quickly ordered the lower court to stop any further proceedings, 
noting that “[t]he duty now lies with the General Assembly to remedy 
[the] educational system.”92 Thus, the thirteen-year legal battle over the 
adequacy of Ohio’s school-financing system ended, and the litigants 
were left with arguably less clarity than when it all began. 
II. Ohio’s School Funding Legislation After DeRolph 
After the DeRolph cases, subsequent administrations have tried to 
implement, with various levels of success, several new educational 
systems, including a “Building Blocks Model” (2003–2009), an 
“Evidence-Based Model” (2009–2011, and Governor Kasich’s “Bridge 
Formula” and “Achievement Everywhere Model” (2012–2019).93 
 
violating the separation of powers to legislate from the bench. Obhof, 
supra note 17, at 134. The move sparked several fiery dissents. See 
DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1241 (Sweeney, J., dissenting) (“I find it 
incredible that the majority takes it upon itself to make unconstitutional 
legislation constitutional.”); id. at 1245 (Cook, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
majority has made an initial policy determination that the judiciary is ill 
equipped to make and that is characteristic of non-justiciability.”). 
87. Obhof, supra note 17, at 136 (quoting an anonymous legislator). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 137. 
90. DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 530; see also Obhof, supra note 17, at 138. 
91. Obhof, supra note 17, at 146. 
92. State ex rel. State v. Lewis (DeRolph V), 789 N.E.2d 195, 202 (Ohio 2003). 
93. See Richard G. Sheridan, Follow the Money: State Budgeting 
and Public Policy in Ohio 288 (4th ed. 2019) (ebook); see also Ohio 
Dep’t of Educ., Bridge Funding Formula Calculation Form 2 
(2012), available at https://education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/ 
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Recently, there has been bipartisan support for a new legislative 
proposal called the “Ohio Fair School Funding Plan,” but advocates 
were unable to gather sufficient support to get the plan into the 2020–
2021 biennial budget.94 The following section gives a brief overview of 
each legislative proposal, as well as an in-depth look at the current state 
of education financing in Ohio. 
A. Building Blocks Model (2003–2009) 
In 2003, going against the advice of key Republicans, Governor Bob 
Taft appointed a Blue Ribbon Task Force on Financing Student 
Success in an attempt to address lingering school-financing issues.95 The 
“[T]ask [F]orce met for 16 months and rolled out an 18-point plan,” 
primarily attempting to address the limitations on local property tax 
collection under House Bill 920.96 The proposal faced immediate 
resistance from both Democrats and Republicans in the legislature, and 
the Governor ultimately ignored the Task Force’s key recommendation 
to remove the phantom revenue problem by allowing local property tax 
revenues to increase with property tax values, up to a predetermined 
cap.97 Instead, the Governor and the legislature cherry-picked the 
remainder of the Task Force’s suggestions to create the Building Blocks 
model.98 
Unlike the Successful Schools Model proposed by Augenblick, the 




 Bridge-Funding-Form-Line-by-Line-Explanation-FY2013.pdf.aspx [https:// 
 perma.cc/9YTF-354E]; Siegel, supra note 1. 
94. See Amy Patterson, Fair Funding Plan for Schools Misses House Budget, 
Geauga Cty. Maple Leaf (May 16, 2019), https://www.geaugamapleleaf 
 .com/news/fair-funding-plan-for-schools-misses-house-budget/ [https://perma 
 .cc/42E7-BEHN]. 
95. Siegel, supra note 1. 
96. Id. 
97. Id.; Yazback, supra note 7, at 705; Christina A. Samuels, Long-Awaited 
Report on Ohio School Aid Calls for Tax Reform, Education Week 
(Feb. 15, 2005), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2005/02/16/23ohio 
.h24.html [https://perma.cc/2P23-E6D5]. 
 
98. Yazback, supra note 7, at 705, 710. For instance, the Governor’s proposed 
budget included several proposals consistent with the Task Force’s 
recommendations including an “acceleration of the phase-out of the 
inventory component of the property tax” and “the two-year phase-out of 
the machinery and equipment component of the property tax.” Id. at 706. 
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the basic needs of an educational program.99 In practice, however, the 
Building Blocks Model functioned much like the School Foundation 
Program and the Successful Schools Model. The Building Blocks Model 
started with a formula amount—the amount established by the state 
as necessary for an adequate education.100 That number was then 
multiplied by the cost-of-doing-business factor and the average daily 
membership of schools.101 Finally, a charge-off amount, representing the 
local share of education costs raised through property taxes, was 
subtracted from the formula amount.102 Thus, the Building Blocks 
Model was primarily tied to a formula amount unmoored from the cost 
of operating schools. The system also relied heavily on local property 
taxes. 
B. Evidence Based Model (2009–2011) 
The next major attempt to reform the school financing system came 
in a 2009 proposal by Governor Ted Strickland. In his 2009 State of the 
State address, Governor Strickland noted he had “embraced an 
evidence-based education approach that harnesse[d] research results 
and applie[d] those findings to Ohio’s specific circumstances.”103 “After 
a contentious legislative session,” the Evidence-Based Model was passed 
as part of the 2010–2011 biennium budget.104 The model was designed 
to be phased in over nine years.105 
Strickland’s Evidence Based Model built on the fundamentals of 
the Building Blocks Model, “but swept in many elements that had 
previously been addressed by separate programs.”106 It also attempted 
to address both phantom revenue and the system’s over-reliance on 
local property taxes.107 The model created a new option for school 
districts called a “conversion levy,” by which school districts could use 
 
99. See Paul F. Milcetich, A Case Study of Post-DeRolph Public School 
Funding in Ohio 103, 208 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Kent State University) (on file with author). 
100. Yazback, supra note 7, at 698. 
101. Id. at 698–99. 
102. Id. at 699. 
103. Lawrence O. Picus & Allan Odden, Review and Analysis of Ohio’s 
Evidence-Based Model 1 (2009), available at http://picusodden.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Ohio-EB-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
 7TGG-3BF3]. 
104. Ohio Sch. Funding Advisory Council, supra note 59, at 7. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 6. 
107. Carla Edlefson, Not Funding the Evidence-Based Model in Ohio 4–6 (Mar. 
19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://files.eric.ed.gov/ 
 fulltext/ED509027.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4BJ-D48K]. 
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a levy to convert some millage into dollars that were not subject to 
H.B. 920’s tax-reduction factors.108 It also reduced the local-share 
expectation from twenty-three mills to twenty mills.109 Finally, the 
model also included many new initiatives such as “[i]ncreasing the 
length of the school year to 200 days,” “[p]roviding full-day 
Kindergarten to all students,” “[i]mproving educator quality,” and 
“[e]stablishing an effective accountability system.”110 Unfortunately, 
Governor Strickland’s plans were dashed when he lost re-election to 
Governor Kasich in 2010. Governor Kasich then wiped out the Evidence 
Based Model in his first budget.111 
C. Bridge Formula & Achievement Everywhere Model (2011–2019) 
Kasich’s Bridge Formula served as “a placeholder formula designed 
to give school districts about the same proportion of a cut in state 
funding when looked at relative to the total amount of money they have 
for education including local dollars.”112 The Bridge Formula adjusted 
the average-daily-membership calculation for each school district by 
subtracting preschool students and adding a percentage of vocational 
students.113 The Bridge Formula also included an additional charge-off 
valuation “to further equalize the fund distributions” across districts 
and to “keep the distributions within the limits of appropriations.”114 
The Bridge Formula was replaced in 2013 by the Achievement 
Everywhere model.115 Although Kasich adjusted the model slightly over 
subsequent budget cycles, the plan remained largely unchanged 
throughout his tenure in office.116 Unlike the Evidence Based Model, 
Kasich’s adjustments to the funding formula were not designed to 
determine the amount necessary to fund adequate schools.117 Instead, 
Kasich developed a “uniform per-pupil formula amount,” called the 
 
108. Id. at 5. 
109. Id. at 6. 
110. Picus & Odden, supra note 103, at 1. 
111. Aaron Marshall, Old Plan Scrapped and Tangible Steps in New Direction Have 




113. Ohio Dep’t of Educ., supra note 93, at 4. 
114. Id. 
115. Kasich Unveils School Funding Overhaul Plan, WLWT5.com (Jan. 31, 
2013, 7:10 PM), https://www.wlwt.com/article/kasich-unveils-school-funding-
overhaul-plan-1/3528591 [https://perma.cc/7ZM3-W4T3]. 
116. Sheridan, supra note 93. 
117. Id. 
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Opportunity Grant, based on resource availability, not empirical 
evidence.118 Kasich’s education plan focused on achieving his priorities 
of fiscal responsibility, accountability, and school choice.119 
The public’s response to the Achievement Everywhere Model split 
largely along partisan lines. Liberal-leaning organizations lamented the 
plan for inadequately increasing education funding, relying on local 
property taxes, pushing school privatization, and making it easier to 
cut teachers’ pay.120 Conservative organizations, on the other hand, 
praised the plan for deregulating education, encouraging competition, 
and increasing transparency and accountability in schools.121 
D. Current Ohio Education-Funding System 
Although current Ohio Governor Mike DeWine has proposed some 
increased funding for wraparound services, his latest biennial budget 
has largely left intact Kasich’s Achievement Everyone Model.122 Thus, 
the current school-funding model is a result of this hodge-podge of 
legislation and still maintains many components of the School 
Foundation Program from the DeRolph era. Ohio school districts still 
receive funding from three primary sources: local governments, state 
governments, and the federal government.123 In fiscal year 2018, 45.8% 
of all education funding statewide came from local sources, and 48.8% 
came from state sources.124 
 
118. Id. at 288. 
119. Chad L. Aldis, John Kasich’s Education Legacy, Thomas Fordham 
Inst. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://fordhaminstitute.org/ohio/commentary/ 
 john-kasichs-education-legacy [https://perma.cc/8K9W-B5PS]. 
120. Innovation Ohio, A Closer Look: The Kasich Record on Public 
Education 5–6, 8–10, 13 (2015), available at http://innovationohio.org/ 
 wp-content/uploads/2015/08/IO-Report-Kasich-Edu-Record.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/VY9Z-DDBB]. 
121. Paul T. Hill, Steps in the Right Direction: Assessing “Ohio 
Achievement Everywhere”—the Kasich Plan 5 (2013), available at 
https://fordhaminstitute.org/ohio/research/steps-right-direction [https:// 
 perma.cc/MR5R-T6EJ]. 
122. Jessie Balmert & Jackie Borchardt, Education, Cigarettes and Taxes: 
What Does Ohio Gov. DeWine’s Budget Mean for You?, Cincinnati 
Enquirer (Mar. 15, 2019, 3:42 PM), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/ 
 news/politics/2019/03/14/ohio-gov-mike-dewine-rolls-out-first-budget/ 
 3143612002/ [https://perma.cc/EW8D-GLFA]; Investing in Ohio’s Schools, 
Colleges, and Universities, Office of Budget & Mgmt., https://archives 
 .obm.ohio.gov/Files/Budget_and_Planning/Operating_Budget/Fiscal_
Years_2020-2021/Enacted/Investing_in_Education.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
 CPP4-A3MK] (last visited June 28, 2020). 
123. Legislative Budget Office, supra note 9. 
124. Id. 
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Ohio funds education primarily through base funding called the 
“Opportunity Grant,” as well as through categorical add-ons for special 
education, transportation, students living in poverty, and other variable 
funding components for “non-typical students.”125 The Opportunity 
Grant comprises two key components: the formula amount and the 
state-share index.126 The formula amount is a per-pupil amount similar 
to the base amount described in the DeRolph cases. As of the 2019 fiscal 
year, the formula amount was $6,020.127 That amount is multiplied by 
the state-share index, a formula designed to assess a district’s capacity 
to raise local revenue for funding education.128 The state-share index 
ranges from 5–90%, depending on a school district’s relative wealth and 
property values in that district.129 
 
125. Id. at 7–8. 
126. Id. at 17. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 9. 
129. Id. at 10–13. The state-share index is defined by statute and determined 
by comparing various state-constructed statistics including: (1) the 
valuation index; (2) the income index; and (3) the wealth index. See Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 3317.017 (West 2020). The wealth index is key as it 
compares the valuation index with the income index and is ultimately 
converted into the state-share index. See id. at § 3317.017(C)–(D). To 
construct the wealth index, first the State creates the valuation and 
income indexes. Id. at § 3317.01(C). The valuation index is the three-year 
average property valuation per pupil by district weighted against the 
average state property valuation. Id. at § 3317.017(A). It is calculated as 
follows (ADM stands for “average daily membership”):  
(district’s three-year average valuation ÷ district’s total ADM) ÷ 
[(the statewide three-year average valuation for school districts 
with a total ADM > 0) ÷ statewide total ADM].  
 Id. The income index is the weighted median income by district per pupil 
(from the Ohio Department of Taxation and federal adjusted gross 
income) compared to the statewide median income by district per pupil. 
Id. at § 3317.017(B). The Income Index is calculated as follows:  
[(district’s median Ohio adjusted gross income ÷ median of the 
median Ohio adjusted gross income of all districts statewide with 
a total ADM > 0) × 0.5] + {[(three-year average federal adjusted 
gross income of the school district’s residents ÷ district’s formula 
ADM for fiscal year 2017) ÷ (three-year average federal adjusted 
gross income of all districts statewide with a formula ADM for 
fiscal year 2017 > 0 ÷ statewide formula ADM for fiscal year 
2017)] × 0.5}  
 Id. The wealth index is determined by first comparing the income index 
to the valuation index. Id. at § 3317.017(C). When a district’s income 
index is less than the district’s valuation index and less than 1.5, then the 
wealth index is calculated as:  
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Once the Opportunity Grant is calculated, it is supplemented with 
“targeted assistance” and “capacity aid.”130 Targeted assistance is 
“additional funding to districts with lower capacities to raise local 
revenues.”131 Capacity aid is “based on the amount a district can raise 
with one mill (the district’s capacity amount) and is provided to 
districts that raise less than the median amount.”132 Finally, the 
Opportunity Grant is adjusted either by temporary transitional aid 
(often referred to as “guarantees”) or a gain cap, depending on a 
district’s change in enrollment.133  
These adjustments are largely products of all the prior changes to 
the school-funding formula.134 One major concern for each 
administration was to avoid drastically reducing a district’s budget 
from year to year due to a formula gain.135 As a result, the temporary 
transitional aid was designed to ensure that districts experiencing major 
losses in enrollment did not face significant funding cuts.136 Temporary 
transitional aid is provided to districts to guarantee that they receive 
at least 100% of the previous fiscal year’s state aid, unless the district 
 
(valuation index × 0.6) + (income index × 0.4)  
 Id. at § 3317.017(C)(1). If, however, the income index is greater than the 
valuation index, then the wealth index will be equal to the valuation 
index. Id. at § 3317.017(C)(2). Finally, the wealth index is converted into 
the state-share index based on a statutory formula by which low-wealth 
districts receive up to 90% of the formula amount, and high-wealth 
districts receive only 5%. Id. at § 3317.017(D). According to the statute, 
the district’s state share index is determined as follows: 
(a) If the district’s wealth index is less than or equal to 0.35, then 
the district’s state share index shall be equal to 0.90. 
(b) If the district’s wealth index is greater than 0.35 but less than 
or equal to 0.90, then the district’s state share index shall be equal 
to {0.40 × [(0.90 - the district’s wealth index) ÷ 0.55]} + 0.50. 
(c) If the district’s wealth index is greater than 0.90 but less than 
1.8, then the district’s state share index shall be equal to {0.45 × 
[(1.8 - the district’s wealth index) ÷ 0.9]} + 0.05. 
(d) If the district’s wealth index is greater than or equal to 1.8, 
then the district’s state share index shall be equal to 0.05.  
 Id. 
130. Legislative Budget Office, supra note 9, at 8. 
131. Id. at 18. 
132. Id. at 23. 
133. Id. at 42–44.  
134. Id. at 3.  
135. Id. at 46. 
136. Id. at 42.  
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lost more than 10% of its enrollment in recent years.137 Even if a 
district’s enrollment decreases by 10% or more, the district is 
guaranteed 95% of the aid it received in the immediately previous 
year.138 In the 2018 fiscal year, the state paid $221.4 million in 
temporary transitional aid to 328 districts, which accounted for 53.8% 
of the school districts in the state.139 
The gain cap serves as a limit on state funding for rapidly growing 
districts in an attempt to protect the state from ballooning education 
costs. The state capped districts’ annual funding increases at either 3% 
or by a percentage proportionate to the district’s increase in its average 
daily membership (up to 6% in fiscal year 2019).140 As of the 2019 fiscal 
year, fourteen districts’ funding were limited by the gain cap.141 The 
gain cap is unpopular in high-growth districts, such as the Olentangy 
Local School District near Columbus.142 The adjustments to the 
Opportunity Grant and categorical add-ons create wide discrepancies 
in the amount of state funding a district receives. In fiscal year 2018, 
the statewide average foundation funding per pupil was $4,770, with 
the poorest quartile receiving $7,737 per pupil and the wealthiest 
quartile receiving $2,264 per pupil.143 
E. Ohio Fair School Funding Plan 
Representatives Bob Cupp (R-Lima) and John Patterson (D-
Jefferson) have championed the most recent effort to reform Ohio’s 
school funding system.144 In 2017 Cupp and Patterson convened Ohio’s 
superintendents and treasurers, and over a period of fifteen months the 
 
137. Id. at 42–43. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 43. 
140. Id. at 44. 
141. Id.  
142. Thomas Gallick, The Big Short: Districts Lament Funding Cap, 
ThisWeekNews (Apr. 18, 2018, 1:58 PM), https://www.thisweeknews.com/ 
 news/20180418/big-short-districts-lament-funding-cap [https://perma.cc/ 
 8SKY-WES4]; Jim Siegel, School Funding Cap Hits Central Ohio Districts 




143. Legislative Budget Office, supra note 9, at 48.  
144. Both Representatives serve on the House Primary and Secondary 
Education Committee. See Primary and Secondary Education Committee, 
Ohio House of Representatives, http://www.ohiohouse.gov/committee/ 
 primary-and-secondary-education [https://perma.cc/G5VQ-6SUY] (last 
visited June 28, 2020). 
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group discussed education-funding reforms.145 The group divided into 
subgroups to research and propose solutions on eight different focus 
areas: (1) school funding base cost, (2) distribution, (3) poverty and 
preschool, (4) special education, gifted, and English learners, (5) charter 
funding, (6) educational service centers, career technical education, and 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) programs, 
(7) technology in schools, and (8) transportation.146 The group’s efforts 
culminated in a twenty-seven-page report that Cupp and Patterson 
unveiled at a press conference on March 25, 2019.147 
One of the key changes recommended in the Fair School Funding 
Plan is to overhaul the Opportunity Grant formula as a new base-cost 
formula.148 Unlike the current formula amount, which the Plan claims 
“has no discernible relationship to any objective criteria for determining 
an appropriate per student funding level,” the base-cost formula was 
“built around the student and the educational experience.”149 The base-
cost amount was designed to “allocat[e] sufficient resources to provide 
an average child . . . with the essential high quality opportunities 
necessary for success.”150 The proposed base-cost formula is broken 
down into four weighted components: 60% for direct classroom 
instruction, 20% for school leadership and operations, 15% instructional 
and student supports, and 5% for district leadership and accountability 
measures.151 The Plan claims that the formula “account[s] for what it 
actually costs to run a school district.”152 
The Plan also proposes replacing entirely the state-share index with 
a new method for determining the local share of school funding.153 First, 
the local capacity of each district to levy property taxes would be 
 
145. Press Conference—School Funding Workgroup Plan Rollout, Ohio Channel 
(Mar. 25, 2019), http://www.ohiochannel.org/video/press-conference-school-
funding-workgroup-plan-rollout [https://perma.cc/7ST6-R3AN].  
146. Ohio Fair Sch. Funding, Fair School Funding Plan 5 (2019), available 
at https://sites.google.com/view/ohiofairschoolfunding/report [https://perma 
 .cc/2LCN-JZP5]. The group comprised nine sub-groups, one of which 
focused on communications related to the report. Id. 
147. Press Conference—School Funding Workgroup Plan Rollout, supra note 
145. See generally Ohio Fair Sch. Funding, supra note 146. 
148. Ohio Fair Sch. Funding, supra note 146, at 7.  
149. Id. at 7–8. 
150. Id. at 7. 
151. Id. at 8. 
152. Id.  
153. Id. at 10. 
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established.154 “Since the average local funding contribution for all Ohio 
school districts has ranged from twenty to twenty-three mills,” the Plan 
recommends setting each district’s local capacity at 2.25% (or the 
equivalent of 22.5 mills).155 The local share is then calculated by 
determining the taxable property valuation per pupil156 and the average 
income per pupil in the district.157 The property valuation per pupil is 
weighted at 60% and the average income per pupil is weighted at 40%.158 
To calculate the final per-pupil local share, the weighted property 
valuation and the weighted average income are added together; the 
entire amount is then multiplied by the district’s local capacity (i.e., 
2.25%).159 
Unlike the state-share index, the funding amount for all school 
districts under Cupp and Johnson’s Plan is now weighted by average 
income per pupil.160 Thus, communities with high incomes and relatively 
low property values will likely benefit less from the Fair School Funding 
Plan. The Plan also recommended increasing funding for students living 
in poverty from $272 per student to $422 per student, and providing 
preschool for every four-year-old child living in poverty.161 
 
154. See Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet, Fair School Funding Plan: State/Local 
Distribution Calculator, available at https://sites.google.com/view/ohio 
 fairschoolfunding/report [https://perma.cc/2LCN-JZP5] (click “School/ 
 Local Distribution Calculator”) (last visited June 28, 2020). 
155. See id. 
156. See id. (“The property tax weight is based on the total taxable valuation 
per pupil. The formula uses the lower of the average of the most recent 
[three] years of taxable value or the most recent year. It uses the number 
of pupils from the final count in the previous year (students enrolled in 
and be educated at the district only).”). 
157. See id. (“The income component has [two] equally weighted parts that 
total to the remaining 40% local capacity, the total Federal Adjusted 
Gross Income and the Median Federal Adjusted Gross Income. The 
Federal Adjusted Gross Income per pupil uses the lower of the most recent 
three-year average or the most recent year. The Median Federal Adjusted 
Gross Income will use the median from the most recent year and multiply 
by the total number of tax returns. This number is then divided by the 
total number of pupils. Median income is used because it eliminates 
distortions in an average gross income that may be present due to 
unusually large or small incomes present in the district.”). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. See Ohio Fair Sch. Funding, supra note 146, at 10 (explaining that the 
new method accounts for a district’s property values and its residents’ 
income capacities).  
161. Id. at 12–13. 
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Although there are many laudable aspects of the Fair School 
Funding Plan, it has also received some criticism.162 Much of the 
criticism arose after the taskforce released simulation spreadsheets that 
outlined how much funding each district would receive under the new 
plan.163 The spreadsheets revealed that eighty-seven districts, including 
many poor districts, “would net no new money over two years.”164 In 
addition, the “formula sends 15% of new funding to the wealthiest 
suburban districts, compared to 5% to major urban districts and 9% to 
the poorest rural districts.”165 Howard Fleeter, a lead analyst with the 
Ohio Education Policy Institute, noted that urban districts seem to be 
negatively impacted by the Plan’s exclusion of charter and private-
voucher students.166 “When calculating local property and income 
wealth per pupil, removing thousands of students from the equation 
 
162. See Jim Siegel, Wealthy Districts Would Gain Money in New Ohio Schools 
Plan, Columbus Dispatch (Apr. 8, 2019, 5:48 AM), https://www.dispatch 
 .com/news/20190408/wealthy-districts-would-gain-money-in-new-ohio-
schools-plan [https://perma.cc/K8WL-AXCP] (criticizing the Fair School 
Funding Plan for providing inadequate funding for low-income districts); 
Editorial, Ohio Falls Short of Fair Funding for Schools, Toledo Blade 
(Apr. 5, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.toledoblade.com/opinion/editorials/ 
 2019/04/05/ohio-general-assembly-fair-funding-for-schools/stories/2019 
 0403159 [https://perma.cc/3AZJ-DFA8] (same); Tom Troy, Ohio’s School 
Funding Plan Forgets ‘DeRolph’ Case, Toledo Blade (Apr. 12, 2019, 
12:00 AM), https://www.toledoblade.com/opinion/columnists/2019/04/ 
 12/remember-rerolph-school-funding-less-property-taxes-toledo-public-
schools/stories/20190411113 [https://perma.cc/55BG-UB9R] (same); 
Ohio Public Radio, Charter Schools Would See Less Money Under 
Proposed School Funding Formula, WCBE.org (Apr. 23, 2019), https:// 
 www.wcbe.org/post/charter-schools-would-see-less-money-under-proposed-
school-funding-formula [https://perma.cc/EK5C-ULEC] (criticizing the 
Fair School Funding Plan for failing to increase funding for charter 
schools); Editorial, Worthy Effort on Ohio School Funding Equity Needs 
Adjustments and a Full and Honest Debate, Cleveland.com (Apr. 7, 
2019), https://www.cleveland.com/opinion/2019/04/worthy-effort-on-ohio-
school-funding-equity-needs-adjustments-and-a-full-and-honest-debate-
editorial.html [https://perma.cc/6CJN-6F37] (criticizing the Fair School 
Funding Plan for costing far more than an alternative plan while still 
underfunding low-income districts). 
163. See Troy, supra note 162; Report, Ohio Fair Sch. Funding, https:// 
 sites.google.com/view/ohiofairschoolfunding/report [https://perma.cc/ 
 2LCN-JZP5] (cautioning that the simulations are only estimates and may 
change based on changes in local capacity) (last visited June 28, 2020). 
164. Siegel, supra note 162. 
165. See id. 
166. Jim Siegel, Education Experts Weigh Pros and Cons of New Ohio School-
Funding Plan, Columbus Dispatch (Apr. 9, 2019, 5:53 PM), https:// 
 www.dispatch.com/news/20190409/education-experts-weigh-pros-and-cons-
of-new-ohio-school-funding-plan/1 [https://perma.cc/F9PS-HNX6]. 
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makes a district look significantly wealthier.”167 Perhaps because of 
those criticisms, the Ohio Fair School Funding Plan did not gain the 
necessary support in the General Assembly to be adopted as part of the 
2020–2021 biennial budget.168 
III. Impact of DeRolph Twenty-Five Years Later 
Reflecting on the legislative and executive efforts to revamp Ohio’s 
education-financing system since DeRolph, it is clear that although each 
administration has tweaked the school-funding formula, its basic 
elements have remained the same for nearly fifty years. And while each 
legislature and administration has attempted to develop its own model, 
almost every system has followed a similar pattern of the Foundation 
Program: starting with a base-cost calculation and tacking on some 
“charge-off” or “state-share” amount to account for local 
contributions.169 Educational administrators have commented that the 
base cost portion of all education-financing systems in Ohio since the 
1970s has followed a “residual budgeting” model.170 One administrator 
described residual budgeting as “a concept of politically determining an 
amount of money [and] building a formula to distribute that amount of 
money as opposed to that formula having any direct relationship with 
the need of the students.”171 The DeRolph court pointed to this 
“budgetary residual” allocation as one of the failings of the School 
Foundation Program.172 And yet, over two decades later, the General 
Assembly has yet to fix this flaw. 
 
Instead of addressing the budgetary-residual issue, the General 
Assembly has attempted to address DeRolph’s concerns by simply 
increasing appropriations to education. According to data from the 
National Center for Education Statistics, over the course of DeRolph’s 
thirteen-year litigation, Ohio increased its real funding per pupil by 
 
167. Id. 
168. School Funding Plan Won’t Be In Ohio House Version of the State Budget 
Proposal, WCBE.org (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.wcbe.org/post/school-
funding-plan-wont-be-ohio-house-version-state-budget-proposal [https:// 
 perma.cc/BNG9-ZCD2]. 
169. Milcetich, supra note 99, at 76–78 (defining the base-cost formula, charge 
off, and state share). 
170. Id. at 103–09. 
171. Id. at 107. 
172. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ohio 1997). 
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52%, from $3,877.87 in 1991, to $5,829.49 in 2002.173 In the fifteen years 
following DeRolph V, Ohio’s real per-pupil funding has increased only 
by 12%, from $5,829.49 in 2002, to $6,525.77 in 2015.174 
 
Although correlation does not imply causation, statements from 
lawmakers at the time of the DeRolph tend to imply that DeRolph 
spurred legislative activity on education funding.175 Unfortunately, the 
pressure on Ohio lawmakers created by DeRolph seems to have been 
short lived, and real increases in education funding have been muted 
since DeRolph concluded. Further, a recent study by the Ohio 
Educational Policy Institute found that, from 1999–2019, the 
percentage increase in funding for the lowest wealth districts in Ohio 
only marginally outpaced the percentage increase in funding from state 
 
173. See Jessica Ice, Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet, Ohio School Data 
Spreadsheets: National Center for Education Statistics, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and Author’s Calculations (on file with author) (gathering data 
on school district revenues and expenditures from the National Center for 
Education Statistics Elementary and Secondary Information System, and 
Consumer Price Index data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; school 
district revenues by source have been adjusted by the Consumer Price 
Index by the author, graphs have been created by the author). 
174. Id. 
175. See Julie Carr Smyth, Ohio School-Funding Suit Derolph v. State Leaves 
Mark After 20 Years, Akron Beacon J. (Mar. 24, 2017, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.beaconjournal.com/akron/news/ohio-school-funding-suit-
derolph-v-state-leaves-mark-after-20-years [https://perma.cc/B7HK-2R77].  
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and local revenues for the highest wealth districts.176 Ohio’s lowest 
income schools received a funding increase from state and local revenues 
of 29.4%; the highest wealth districts received an increase of 25.6%.177 
The Ohio Educational Policy Institute argues that this relatively small 
gap partially explains why school-funding equity has not significantly 
improved in Ohio after DeRolph.178 
In addition, although several administrations have attempted to 
address the issue of overreliance on local tax revenues, including 
Strickland’s Evidence-Based Model and the most recent Ohio Fair 
School Funding Plan, the political will to fundamentally adjust the 
school-funding formula and appropriate sufficient funds has not been 
strong enough to bring these plans to fruition. True, the gap in state 
and local funding has narrowed since 1991, but local funding has 
consistently been the largest source of funding for Ohio’s school 
districts.179 Analyzing per-pupil funding using National Center for 
Education Statistics, most of the reduction in the gap between state 
and local funding has actually come from reduced local funding around 
the Great Recession years.180 
 
 
176. See Ohio Educ. Policy Inst., 20 Years of School Funding Post-




178. Id. at 4.  
179. Ice, supra note 173. 
180. Id. 
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DeRolph did, however, have some positive side effects that have 
had a lasting impact on schools. The most obvious is the increased 
expenditure on educational facilities. As outlined by one administrator: 
The other big impact of the DeRolph decision in terms of school 
facilities spending, there really was hardly any state support for 
school facilities, and if you were a poor district that has trouble 
raising money to staff your buildings you’re going to have the 
exact same problem in terms of maintaining your buildings, 
renovating them, building new buildings as you need them. The 
fact that we’ve spent over 10 billion dollars on school facilities 
and we’ve started from the poorest district and are working our 
way upward on a list, that’s literally a concrete example of, if 
nothing else had happened, the DeRolph decision.181  
The Ohio Facilities Construction Commission estimated that, in 
the twenty years following DeRolph I, the state has spent over $11.5 
billion on the construction and improvements of school facilities.182 Such 
spending “has led to the opening of over 1,180 new or renovated 
buildings, reaching an estimated 650,000 students.”183 Data from the 
National Center for Education Statistics supports this conclusion, 
indicating a sharp increase in state facilities’ construction expenditures 
since 1997.184 Note, however, that facilities’ construction expenditures 
dropped off significantly in 2011.185 Thus, whether the investments in 
Ohio’s education infrastructure will continue in the long run is yet to 
be seen. 
 
Lawmakers and political activists are certainly aware of the 
DeRolph decisions, and will pay them lip service when it is politically 
expedient to do so.186 However, the final school-funding policies tend to 
 
181. Milcetich, supra note 99, at 146–47. 
182. David Williamson, A History of Success: The Ohio School Facilities 
Commission 20th Anniversary, Sch. Bus. Officials Q., June 2017, at 
49, 49. 
183. Id. 
184. Ice, supra note 173. 
185. Id. 
186. See Jim Siegel, 20 Years After DeRolph, State Not Even Trying to 
Determine Legal Duty, Columbus Dispatch (Mar. 24, 2017, 6:46 PM), 
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20170324/20-years-after-derolph-state-
not-even-trying-to-determine-legal-duty [https://perma.cc/PX64-H57V] 
(highlighting the ongoing debate between legislators about funding in a 
post-DeRolph world). See Kantele Franko, Lawmakers Unveil Proposal to 
Overhaul Ohio’s School Funding, WKYC (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www 
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be a result of the current political landscape, not whether those policies 
create a “thorough and efficient system of common schools.” 
Conclusion 
In the twenty-five years since DeRolph I was first decided in the 
Perry Common Pleas Court, lawmakers, jurists, researchers, and Case 
Western Reserve Law Review contributors have grappled with its 
implications. Some of the legal questions brought up in the original 
litigation have been resolved, such as whether Ohio recognizes a 
fundamental right to education. Yet many other questions remain 
unanswered, such as what constitutes a “thorough and efficient” system 
of education and what must the state do to implement such a system. 
Since the Ohio Supreme Court referred the problem to the General 
Assembly, ultimately it has been politics—not a legal framework—that 
has shaped Ohio’s current education-financing system. 
Reflecting on the historical evidence and current data, I conclude 
that DeRolph did not have the desired impact of forcing the Ohio 
General Assembly to overhaul the state’s education-finance system. 
DeRolph did, however, have some positive side effects, including a 
short-term increase in per-pupil education funding and a large increase 
in investment in educational infrastructure. Whether Ohio can 
maintain these improvements or eventually create a system that 
complies with DeRolph’s requirements will be the work for the next 
generation of lawmakers, researchers, and legal scholars. As one 
administrator put it, “[t]he bad thing that came out of the DeRolph 
litigation was furthering the notion that someday out there, there is a 
fix for school funding in Ohio and I don’t think there is one. I don’t 





 perma.cc/NN8J-YVU8] (Cupp and Patterson referencing the uncon–
stitutionality of Ohio school financing while attempting to pass new school 
financing legislation); Jeremy Pelzer, State Should be Given More Power 
To Redistribute School Funding, Ohio Speaker Says, Cleveland.com 
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